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ABSTRACT
Deep learning has been achieving top performance in many tasks.
Since training of a deep learning model requires a great deal of cost,
we need to treat neural network models as valuable intellectual
properties. One concern in such a situation is that some malicious
user might redistribute the model or provide a prediction service
using the model without permission. One promising solution is
digital watermarking, to embed a mechanism into the model so
that the owner of the model can verify the ownership of the model
externally. In this study, we present a novel attack method against
watermark, query modification, and demonstrate that all of the ex-
isting watermark methods are vulnerable to either of query modifi-
cation or existing attack method (model modification). To overcome
this vulnerability, we present a novel watermarking method, expo-
nential weighting. We experimentally show that our watermarking
method achieves high verification performance of watermark even
under a malicious attempt of unauthorized service providers, such
as model modification and query modification, without sacrificing
the predictive performance of the neural network model.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has been achieving top performance on many tasks
such as object recognition[9, 16], speech recognition[1, 8], natural
language processing[2], and so on. Training of a deep learning
model requires a great deal of cost: preparation of a large-scale
labeled training dataset, a massive amount of computer resources
for model training, and human resources spent on parameter tuning
and model architecture design. For these reasons, neural network
models are treated as valuable intellectual properties.
Shortly, neural network models or prediction APIs with using
neural network models will be distributed only to licensed model
users as a charged software or service. In such a situation, one
concern is that some malicious model user who obtains a high-
performance model might redistribute licensed models illegally
or provide a prediction service using the licensed model without
permission. Also, some model user might leak the architecture and
weight parameters of the licensed model in public unintentionally.
To deal with such leakage, we require a method that allows us to
verify the ownership of models externally. One promising solution
is digital watermarking, to embed a mechanism into the model for
external ownership verification.
Suppose a service provider obtains a neural network model from
a model owner, and the service provider provides a prediction
service using the model. Here, the prediction service means that,
given a sample (e.g., image) as a query, the service provider returns
the result of inference (e.g., recognition result) of the query using
the neural network model. When the service provider provides a
prediction service without the permission of the model owner, we
call such a user an unauthorized service provider.
We investigate ownership verification of neural networks using
a watermark, which enables the owner of a watermarked model
to prove whether or not a service provider provides his prediction
service using the watermarked model obtained by the model owner.
In this study, we focus on ownership verification in the black-box
setting. In this setting, ownership verification is performed only by
interactions between a model owner and an unauthorized service
provider throughout the prediction service; themodel owner cannot
verify the model used by the unauthorized service provider directly.
The unauthorized service provider might attempt to invalidate
the verification process at verification time so that the illegal use
of the model is not revealed to the model owner. The objective
of this work is to establish a watermarking method for neural
networks that allows the model owner to verify the ownership
of the model with high probability in the black-box setting even
when the unauthorized service provider attempts to collapse the
verification process in various ways.
1.1 Related Work
Uchida et al.[18] proposed a framework for digital watermarks for
deep learning models for the first time in the white-box setting. The
white-box setting assumes that the model owner can obtain the
target model including the model parameters and she can directly
investigate the model to verify the ownership. In their procedure,
the model owner generates a key vector appropriately chosen in ad-
vance and trains the model so that the product of a specified model
parameter matrix in the model and the key vector corresponds to a
particular vector. Given a model, the model owner can verify the
watermark by checking the product. As attacks against watermark,
Uchida et al. [18] introduced model modification, which attempts to
remove watermark from the model by modifying the parameters of
the neural network using fine-tuning or pruning [7]. Similar attack
methods have been considered in [12, 14, 20, 21]. They experimen-
tally show that verification of watermark works successfully even
when the unauthorized service provider attempts to invalidate the
verification by fine-tuning or pruning of the model. One limitation
of this method is that this verification process works only in the
white-box setting.
Adi et al.[20] proposed a digital watermark that works in the
black-box setting. They employ a similar watermarking method
to [21] while their main contribution is not on the watermarking
method but the framework for verification. More specifically, Adi et
al. introduced a trusted third party in the verification process and
presented a framework which processes model verification only
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through interaction with the trusted third party. This method pro-
vides rigorous security of the verification process while it requires
the third party and is often costly in actual prediction services.
Merrer et al.[12] proposed a digital watermark using adversarial
examples [17] in the black-box setting. An adversarial example is
a sample created by adding a small perturbation to the sample so
that the model mispredicts the resulting sample. In their watermark
method, it generates a set of adversarial examples, relabels them
with correct labels (e.g., generates adversarial examples that are rec-
ognized as “panda” by humans but are misrecognized as “gibbon” by
the model; and then relabels them as “panda”), and then the model
is retrained (fine-tune) with relabeled adversarial examples. Due
to transferability of adversarial examples [17], models without this
watermark misrecognize such adversarial examples with high prob-
ability while the model with watermark (e.g., fine-tuned with these
particular adversarial examples) are expected to recognize such
adversarial examples correctly. The model owner verifies model
ownership by measuring this gap. Their watermarking method is
precisely the same as adversarial training [5], which is established
initially as a defense for adversarial examples while it is commonly
used as a technique to improve the generalization performance of
neural network[13]. For this reason, this watermarking method
can falsely determine models without watermark as models with a
watermark.
Zhang et al.[21] proposed threewatermarkingmethods for image
recognition models in the black-box setting. These methods first
generate special training samples called key samples and then train
the target model with normal training samples and key samples.
This method tested three types of key samples: (1) superimposing
a unique image (e.g., logotype, symbol, or random noise) into the
original images, (2) images taken from other tasks unrelated to the
target task, and (3) images of random noise. Then, a label different
from the original label is given to the key samples. At verification
time, the model owner issues query with key samples and tests
whether or not the model returns correct labels specified by key
samples. Guo et al.[6] also proposed a digital watermark similar to
Zhang et al.’s method.
Rouhani et al.[14] proposed two kinds of digital watermarks that
work in both the white-box setting and the black-box setting. In
their method in the black-box setting, key samples are generated
as a pair of a random image and a random label. Here, the random
images are generated so that the distribution of the features of
the random images is distant from the feature distribution of the
training samples with any label.
1.2 Our Contribution
Our contribution of this study is two-fold
(1) We introduce a novel attack method against watermark of
neural networks (query modification), and
(2) we propose a novel watermark method for neural networks
that resists against both model modification and query mod-
ification (exponential weighing).
All of the existing watermark methods evaluate the verifica-
tion performance of watermark assuming unauthorized service
providers invalidate watermark by model modification, such as
fine-tuning and pruning. For the first contribution, we a novel type
of attack against watermark, query modification.
When a query is given, querymodification detects whether or not
the query is a key sample using autoencoder. If the query is detected
as a key sample, the image is modified so that the verification
process fails. For example, suppose a key sample consists of an
image of a dog with logotype “TEST” and labeled as “cat”. Query
modification detects such a key sample and removes the logotype
from the image by using autoencoder. If logotype is removed from
the sample successfully, the model would recognize the sample as
“dog”. Since the verification process relies on the fact that the key
sample is recognized as “cat”, verification collapses.
We confirmed by experiments that, for all existing methods, the
success rates of watermark verification under model modification
and query modification are very much dependent on datasets. Also,
we experimentally demonstrate with four datasets (MNIST, GT-
SRB, CIFAR10, CIFAR100) that no existing watermark method can
achieve high success verification rate under model modification and
query modification. This result indicates that existing watermark
methods are not sufficiently resistant to attack against watermark.
Considering this, we present a novel watermarking method that
is tolerant of watermark invalidation by both model modification
and query modification. Our watermarking method consists of two
components, (1) key sample generation by label change and (2) key
sample embedding by exponential weighting.
One of the reasons that some of the existing watermark methods
of [21] are vulnerable to query modification is that autoencoder
can remove or dilute particular images superimposed on key sam-
ples. To improve tolerability against such attack, we introduce key
samples that are indistinguishable from normal training samples.
More specifically, we use normal images chosen from training sam-
ples as key samples without making any modification except that
labels that are different from the original labels are given to the key
samples. Recall that queries that unauthorized service providers
observe are only a set of images without labels. As long as images
are not modified at all, unauthorized service providers cannot dis-
tinguish key samples from normal samples for query modification.
We call key samples generated in this way key samples with label
change.
Watermarking with such key samples with label change is toler-
ant of query modification. However, the watermark is still vulnera-
ble to model modification for some datasets. To overcome this, we
introduce a novel training algorithm for watermarking, exponen-
tial weighting. Our algorithm trains the model so that only model
parameters with large absolute values contribute to prediction.
By doing so, the resulting model becomes tolerant of both model
modification and query modification without sacrificing prediction
performance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes back-
ground of this study. Section 3 formally defines the problem of
watermarking neural networks. Section 4 introduces query modifi-
cation by autoencoder and demonstrates that query modification
can significantly affect the verification performance of existing
methods. In Section 5, we compare the predictive performance
and verification performance of the watermarked model with nine
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types of existing watermarking methods and show that our pro-
posal achieves better predictive performance and better verification
performance with fewer queries. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Digital watermarking
Digital watermarking is mainly used to protect the copyrights of
digital contents, such as images and music, by detecting illegal
copying or falsification of digital contents. Digital watermarking
consists of two steps, embedding and verification. In the embedding
step, we embed watermarkW in digital contentC using embedding
algorithm embed as embed(C,W ) = CW . We suppose content CW
might be modified due to noise or signal processing influences. We
denote such a modified content by C˜W . In the verification step, we
judge whether watermarkW is embedded in the given content C˜W
using the verification algorithm verify as verify(C˜W ,W ) = true or
false.
2.2 Deep learning
Deep learning is a machine learning method with a structure called
deep neural networks (DNN). DNN consists of many units such
as linear perceptron, convolution, nonlinear activation function,
which are arranged in layers. DNN transforms input data into
abstract features as it goes through the layer, and the result is
finally outputted using the features.
In this paper, we consider supervised classification. Let us denote
the input as x ∈ RD , and the corresponding label as t ∈ [M] where
[M] = {1, 2, . . . ,M}. The inputs and labels are i.i.d. samples from
an underlying data distribution p(x , t). Then, DNN is defined as
a probabilistic classifier f : Rd → ∆M that outputs a probability
vector y ∈ ∆M where ∆ denotes theM dimensional simplex and x
is classified as argmax
j
yj . We train DNN f using learning algorithm
L with training dataset Dtr = {(x1, t1), · · · , (xN ,N )}.
DNN for classification employes the softmax function at the
final layer to obtain the probability vector. We denote the feature
transformation by DNN f except the last layer (softmax function)
by Zf (x) = z, z ∈ RM . Then, the final output of DNN f is obtained
by f (x) = softmax(z) using z. Letting zj denote the jth element of z,
the softmax function is defined as softmax(z)j = exp zj/∑Mi exp zi
where z is called logit.
Classification performance of DNN is evlauated by test accuracy.
Letting Dtest = {(x1, t1), (x2, t2), · · · , (xN , tN )} be the test data, the
test accuracy of model f is defined by
accDtestf =
1
|Dtest |
∑
(x,t )∈Dtest
1{argmax
j
f (x)j = t} (1)
where 1{predicate} denotes the indicator function that outputs 1
if the predicate is true; otherwise outputs 0.
3 WATERMARKING NEURAL NETWORK
Suppose an owner of a neural network model (referred to as model
owner) holds a model f . The model owner wishes to distribute the
model to legitimate model users while she does not want the model
to be illegally used by unauthorized (not licensed) model users. To
this end, the model owner embeds a watermark into the neural
network model so that the ownership of the neural network model
can be verified externally in the black-box setting. Section 3.1 and
Section 3.2 formalize embedding and verification of watermarking
for neural networks.
On the other hand, unauthorized service providers attempt to
collapse the verification process for avoiding verification of the
ownership. Section 3.3 describes invalidation of watermark verifi-
cation.
The ultimate goal of the watermarking neural network is to
establish an embedding and a verification algorithm that is not
affected by an attempt of watermark invalidation by unauthorized
service providers.
3.1 Embedding Watermark
To confirm ownership of the model, the model owner embeds a
watermark to model f so that she can verify the ownership. We
use a set of labeled samples K = {(xkeyi , t
key
i )}
|K |
i=1 as a watermark.
We call these labeled samples for watermarking as key samples.
Embedding of a watermark is performed by an embedding function
embed(f ,K) = fK (2)
where, for all (xkeyi , t
key
i ) ∈ K , fK is trained so that
argmax
j
fK (xkeyi )j = t
key
i .
Here, we explain existing watermarking methods in the black-
box setting below.
(1) [21]-content (Zhang et al.[21]). Key samples are created by
superimposing specific logotypes or symbols to original im-
ages and relabeling them with a specific label. In Figure
1(b)-(f), logotype “test” or some symbols are superimposed
to an image of “ship” of CIFAR10 and relabeled as “airplane”.
(2) [21]-unrelated (Zhang et al.[21]). Key samples are taken from
an unrelated dataset, and relabel them with a specific label.
In Figure 1(g), the image is chosen from “1” of MNIST and
labeled it as “airplane” of CIFAR10.
(3) [21]-noise (Zhang et al.[21]). Images of key samples are gen-
erated by adding random Gaussian noise to the original
images. In Figure 1(h), a noisy image labeled as “airplane” is
shown.
(4) [12]-AFS (Adversarial Frontier Stitching, Merrer et al.[12]).
Key samples are generated as adversarial examples of the
target model. Figure 1(i) is an adversarial example of “flog”
of CIFAR10 generated by FGSM [5], which is supposed to be
recognized as “flog” by human but recognized as “deer” by
the model. To transform this adversarial example into a key
sample, the adversarial example is relabeled as “flog”.
(5) [14]-DS (Deepsigns, Rouhani et al.[14]). Key samples are
generated as an image of uniform random noise and labeled
randomly (Figure 1(j)).
Watermark is embedded into a target model by training the
model with key samples generated by either of the methods listed
above. In Rouhani et al. and Merrer et al.’s methods, key samples are
embedded in the model by fine-tuning. First, the model is trained
only with training samples and then retrained with training sam-
ples and key samples. In Zhang et al.’s methods, key samples are
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embedded by the training model from scratch with training samples
and the key samples.
3.1.1 Performance evaluation of embedding. Themodel owner does
not want to degrade the predictive performance of the model by
embedding watermarking. For this, the test accuracy of fK can be
used. If the test accuracy of fK is close to the test accuracy of the
original model f , it means that the predictive performance of the
model is not degraded by watermarking.
3.2 Verification of Watermark
Suppose the model owner tries to confirm the ownership of a target
model д. For verification, the owner issues prediction queries of
key samples K ′ ⊂ K to the unauthorized service provider, obtains
resulting predictions, and evaluates the agreement with the labels
of the key samples (watermark accuracy):
accK
′
д
def
=
1
|K ′ |
∑
(xkey,t key)∈K ′
1{argmax
j
д(xkey)j = tkey}. (3)
If key set K is embedded into the target model appropriately,
accK ′д would become a value close to 1. Thus, the model owner can
verify the watermark by chceking if accK ′д > τacc holds
verify(д,K ′,τacc ) =
{
True, accK ′д > τacc
False, otherwise
. (4)
where τacc is a threshold parameter close to 1.
3.2.1 Performance evaluation of verification. The model owner
wishes to verify the watermark with less error. To evaluate the
verification error, we need to consider two error rates: the true
positive rate and the false positive rate. Given a watermark, the
rate that a model with the watermark is judged as a watermarked
model is called the true positive (TP) rate; the rate that a model
with the watermark is judged as a model without the watermark is
called the false positive (FP) rate. In our experiments, we evaluate
the TP and FP of the verification function and employes the area
under the curve (AUC) as the evaluation criterion of the verification
performance.
Thewatermarkwould be successfully verifiedwith a higher prob-
ability by issuing more queries (i.e., using a larger |K ′ |). However,
the model owner needs to find illegal usage of the model among
a large number of prediction services. In such a situation, issuing
many verification queries to each prediction service is not desirable.
Regarding efficiency, achieving higher AUC with a smaller number
of verification queries is desirable.
3.3 Invalidation of Watermark
Suppose the model owner issues a prediction query to an unau-
thorized service provider with a key sample x . The unauthorized
service provider using model fK tries to invalidate the verification
process in order to avoid verification of the ownership by giving a
modified output
invalid(fK ,x) = y˜ (5)
where function invalid is a function that modifies f (xkey) so that
the verification process fails.
IN this study, we consider two types of invalidation: model modi-
fication and querymodification.Modelmodificationmakes a certain
change on the model for invalidation. Let f˜K be the model after
modifiction. Then invalidation by model modification is formulated
as
invalid(fK ,x) = f˜K (x). (6)
Query modification makes a certain change on the query sample.
Let x˜ be the sample after modifiction. Then invalidation by query
modification is formulated as
invalid(fK ,x) = fK (x˜). (7)
All of the existing invalidation methods are categorized as the
model modification. We introduce existing model modification
methods in the following. Query modification is a novel invali-
dation framework. In Section 4, we propose a query modification
method using autoencoder.
3.3.1 Invalidation by Model Modification. [18] introduced two
types of model modification, retraining, and pruning.
We suppose the unauthorized service provider is allowed to
use a small number of samples for model modification. This is be-
cause if the unauthorized service provider can obtain a sufficiently
large number of samples for training, he can independently train
the model by himself and the unauthorized user would have no
motivation to use the licensed model illegally anymore.
In the following, we explain these model modification methods
performed with a small number of samples.
Re-training. The most straightforward way of removing water-
mark is to retrain the target model with new samples[19]. By doing
so, the effect of the watermark is expected to be removed or de-
creased from the model. [12, 14, 18, 20, 21] employed re-training as
a method to invalidate watermarking.
Pruning. Pruning is originally invented as a method to reduce
the size of large-scale neural networks[7]. [18] utilized pruning
as a method for removal of the watermark. Pruning eliminates a
certain percentage of weighs having smaller absolute values from
the neural network. After pruning, the entire network is retrained
with a small number of training samples to recover the prediction
accuracy. [12, 14, 18, 21] employed pruning as amethod to invalidate
watermarking.
Since pruning with 0 % pruning rate corresponds to re-training,
we consider pruning only in the following.
3.3.2 Performance evaluation of invalidation. The unauthorized
service provider wishes to avoid verification of watermark by the
model owner. In this sense, AUC defined in Section 3.2.1 can be
a performance measure of invalidation (lower is better for the
unauthorized service provider, higher is better for the model owner).
At the same time, the unauthorized service provider does not
wish that the prediction accuracy of the model is degraded by inval-
idation. Thus, the test accuracy of fK under watermark invalidation
can be used as the performance measure of invalidation (higher
is better for the unauthorized model user). If the test accuracy of
fK without invalidation is close to the test accuracy of the model
with invalidation, it means that the invalidation does not degrade
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the prediction performance of the model, which is preferable to the
unauthorized service provider.
3.4 Problem Statement
Watermarking of a neural network and its verification is processed
by following the procedure below.
(1) Embedding. A model owner embeds a watermark (key sam-
ples) K into her model f as fK by fK = embed(f ,K)
(2) Model distribution. An unauthorized service provider ille-
gally obtains the model and provides prediction service on-
line without permission
(3) Verification: The model owner runs the verifiction process
verify(f ,K ′,τacc)) following three steps
(a) Queries for verification: The model owner finds a sus-
picious prediction service and issues prediction queries:
x
key
1 ,x
key
2 , . . . ,x
key
|K ′ | in K
′ ⊆ K for watermark verification
(b) Invalidation of verification: Model user returns invali-
dated responses to the model owner as t˜1, . . . , t˜ |K ′ | where
t˜i = argmax
j
y˜i, j and y˜i = invalid(fK (xkeyi )) for i ∈ [|K ′ |].
Here, invalid can be either of model modification or query
modification (introduced in the next section)
(c) Judgement: The model owner evaluates watermark accu-
racy accK ′f using {t
key
i }
|K ′ |
i=1 and {t˜i }
|K ′ |
i=1 and judgeswhether
or not accK ′д > τacc holds. If it holds, the model owner
verifies the watermark.
Embedding, verification, and invalidation of the watermark are
thus defined as a game between the model owner and the unau-
thorized service provider. From the viewpoint of the model owner,
she wants an embedding function with better predictive perfor-
mance (test accuracy) and a verification function that achieves a
higher AUC (watermark accuracy). On the other hand, from the
viewpoint of the unauthorized service provider, he wants an invali-
dation function that does not significantly degrade the predictive
performance (test accuracy) of the target model while he wants
that the invalidation process degrades the AUC of verification as
much as possible.
4 WATERMARK INVALIDATION BY QUERY
MODIFICATION
In this section, we introduce a novel watermark invalidationmethod,
query modification, and demonstrate that existing watermarking
methods can be significantly collapsed by either of model modifica-
tion or query modification.
Our query modification is composed of two steps: key sample
detection (Section 4.2) and query modification by autoencoder (Sec-
tion 4.3).
(1) Key sample detection step. Given a query, the unauthorized
service provider judges whether or not the query issued by
someone works as a key sample for watermark verification.
(2) Query modification step. If the query is judged as a key
sample at the detection step, the key sample is modified so
that it hinders the verification process. If not, nomodification
is made on the query.
We suppose the unauthorized service provider can obtain a small
number of samples drawn from the training sample distribution
for query modification. We remark that existing model modifica-
tion methods, such as pruning or re-training, assumes that a small
number of samples are available as well.
Our query modification described in the following heavily relies
on autoencoder. We first explain the functionality of autoencoder in
Section 4.1. Then, in Section 4.2, we introduce two criteria to detect
key samples using autoencoder and show that themethod can detect
various types of key samples generated by existing watermarking
methods with high probability. Next, in Section 4.3.1, we compare
model modification and query modification regarding watermark
accuracy (true positive rate). Putting everything together, we obtain
the full query modification algorithm, that detects key samples and
collapses the verification process by deactivating the key samples
selectively.
4.1 Autoencoder
Autoencoder is a particular type of neural network which is com-
monly used to find a low-dimensional representation of high-dimensional
samples in an unsupervised manner[10]. Autoencoder is defined
as a nonlinear map from the sample space to the sample space
AE : Rd → Rd . Autoencoder first compresses high-dimensional
samples into a low-dimensional latent space and then decompresses
the low-dimensional signals into the sample space again so that the
resulting samples closely matches the input.
When an autoencoder is trained with samples drawn from a
distribution, outputs of the autoencoder are known to fit the latent
representation of the distribution. Using this functionality of au-
toencoder, when key samples are created by superimposing specific
images to original images, autoencoder can dilute the superim-
posed image to some extent. Also, when key samples are created by
adding random noise, autoencoder can eliminate the noise to some
extent. In this way, modification of key samples by autoencoder
is expected to eliminate the effect of key samples and hinder the
verification process of the model owner.
We tested the effect of autoencoder with key samples generated
with nine different methods. We employed 6-layer convolutional
autoencoder for this experiment. The detailed structure is shown
in Table 4 in Apeendix A. Figure 1 shows examples of key samples
created from CIFAR10 dataset[11]. Figure 1(a) is an example of
original images; Figure 1(b)-(j) are key samples generated with
Figure 1(a) by methods presented in [21], [12], and [14].
We trained an autoencoder with 5000 samples of CIFAR10 and
applied the autoencoder to key samples. Key samples after applica-
tion of autoencoder are shown in the second row of Figure 1. As we
see from the figures, the superimposed images in Figure 1(b)-(f) are
removed or diluted in Figure 1(l)-(p). Also, noise in Figure 1(h)-(i)
is weakened in Figure 1(r)-(s).
4.2 Key Sample Detection
As we see in the last subsection, autoencoder can eliminate or
dilute superimposed images for certain types of key samples. One
straightforward attack against watermark is to apply autoencoder
to every query. Unfortunately, this does not work well in reality
because application of autoencoder to non-key samples degrades
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(a) original (b) [21]-content
“test”, gray
(c) [21]-content
“test”, blue
(d) [21]-content
symbol
(e) [21]-content
“heart”, gray
(f) [21]-content
“heart”, red
(g) [21]-
unrelated
(h) [21]-noise (i) [12]-AFS (j) [14]-DS
(k) AE(a) (l) AE(b) (m) AE(c) (n) AE(d) (o) AE(e) (p) AE(f) (q) AE(g) (r) AE(h) (s) AE(g) (t) AE(h)
Figure 1: The examples of key samples of existing watermarkmethod (top) and after applying autoencoder each top examples
(bottom). The example (a) is an original image from CIFAR10 that used to making examples of (b)-(f) and (h) by [21]-content
method and the examples of (g),(h),(i) and (j) are key samples of [21]-unrelated, [21]-noise, [12]-AFS and [14]-DS method
respectively.
the prediction accuracy of the model significantly. Considering
that key samples issued by the model owner might be blended in
a large number of regular queries issued by non-model owners at
prediction time, application of autoencoder to every query would
spoil the predictive performance of the prediction service of the
unauthorized service provider.
More intelligent invalidation is to detect queries with key sam-
ples among queries with non-key samples and apply autoencoder
only to the detected key samples. If this is possible, the degradation
of predictive performance can be minimized. In this subsection,
we show that key samples generated by existing methods can be
detected with high probability.
4.2.1 Key sample detection by reconstruction loss. As we see in
the last subsection, superimposed images or noise of key samples
can be eliminated or diluted by autoencoder to some extent. This
observation shows that this type of key samples can be detected
by checking if autoencoder makes a significant change in the input
image.
Let AE be an autoencoder trained with samples drawn from
a training sample distribution of the target classifier. Then, the
reconstruction loss of x introduced by the autoencoder is defined
by
loss(x) = | |x − AE(x)| |22 (8)
where AE(x) is the sample reconstructed with the autoencoder and
∥ · ∥2 denotes the ℓ2 norm. If x is an ordinary sample drawn from
the training sample distribution, the reconstruction loss would be
small. However, if x is a key sample created by making a certain
modification on an ordinal image, the reconstruction loss becomes
relatively larger because the sample does not follow the training
sample distribution. We can identify key samples by using this gap.
More specifically, we judge x as a key sample if loss(x) > τREC
where τREC is a threshold parameter determined in advance.
The threshold τREC is determined empirically by the r percentile
point of the distribution of the reconstruction loss 1. In the following
experiments, we employed the 95% quantile point as the threshold.
4.2.2 Key sample detection by Jensen-Shanon divergence. Detection
by the reconstruction loss pays attention to the change in the sample
space before and after the application of autoencoder. Next, we focus
on the change of the predicted label distribution before and after
application of autoencoder. We measure the difference between
fK (x) and fK (AE(x)). Recall that key samples except [12]-AFS are
generated so that the label of the key samples does not represent
the content of the images or does not agree with the true label of
the original images for verification purpose. Therefore, if the input
is a key sample, the difference between fK (x) and fK (AE(x))would
become large. We use this difference to detect key samples.
Since f (x) forms a probability vector, we measure this difference
by the Jensen-Shanon divergence (JSD):
JSD(fK (x)| | fK (AE(x))) =12KL(fK (x)| |B)
+
1
2KL(fK (AE(x))| |B)
(9)
where KL is Kullback-Leibler divergence KL(fK (x)| | fK (AE(x))) =∑
i fK (x)i log fK (AE(x ))ifK (x )i and B = (fK (x) + fK (AE(x)))/2.
The threshold for detection τJSD is also obtained as the empirical
estimation of the r percentile point of JSD(fK (x)| | fK (AE(x))) for
the sample set given to the unauthorized service provider.
4.2.3 Experimental evaluation of detection rate. We experimentally
evaluate the detection rate of key samples using the two criteria.
Experimental setup. As the target classification model, we em-
ployed ResNet32 [9]. We generated nine types of key samples listed
in Section 3.1 forMNIST[4], GTRSB[15], CIFAR10, andCIFAR100[11]
datasets and embedded them into the model for watermark inde-
pendently. See Section 6.1.1 for the details of the dataset.
1The cut point is a tunable parameter by the unauthorized service provider. If the
unauthorized service provider wants to judge key samples more conservatively at the
sacrifice of the test accuracy, the quantile point with a lower cut point can be used as
the threshold.
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For watermark using [21]-content and [21]-noise, we labeled all
key samples as “0” in MNIST, “20 km/s speed-limit sign” in GTSRB,
“airplane” in CIFAR10, and “apple” in CIFAR100. For [21]-unrelated,
we used images of “m” (2,400 samples) in EMNIST [3] labeled with
“0” as key samples for MNIST. Also, we used images of “1” in MNIST
(6,742 samples) as key samples with label “20 km/s speed-limit
sign”, “airplane”, and “apple”, for GTSRB, CIFAR10 and CIFAR100,
respectively.
Since embedding by [21] requires that the model well general-
izes the symbols or logotypes, it requires a large number of key
samples to embed. Watermarking using [12]-AFS and [14]-DS take
advantage of model overfitting to specific key samples, we used
a relatively smaller number of key samples (30 key samples) for
these methods. We experimentally confirm that if we use a larger
number of key samples for these methods, it degrades the test accu-
racy due to overfitting of the model. For more detail about sample
assignment, see Table 6 in Appendix B.
The threshold τREC and τJSD were determined as the 95 per-
centile point of the reconstruction loss and the Jensen-Shannon
divergence. 10-fold cross-validation with the samples possessed by
the unauthorized user was used for estimation.
Results. Given key samples generated by each method, we eval-
uated the detection rate in Table 1. In the table, the first low “rec loss”
shows the rate that key samples are correctly judged as key samples
when loss(x) > τREC is used as the detection rule. The second low
“JSD” shows the detection rate when JSD(fK (x)| | fK (AE(x))) > τJSD
is used as the detection rule. The third low “both” shows the de-
tection rate when samples satisfying either of loss(x) > τREC or
JSD(fK (x)| | fK (AE(x))) > τJSD are classified as key samples. Since
MNIST dataset consists of gray scale images only, results for [21]-
content(test, blue) and [21]-content(heart, red) are not shown. As
we see from the results, most of the key samples for CIFAR10 and
CIFAR100 can be detected with high probability when we use both
the reconstruction loss and JSD. Also, not all but some of the key
samples for MNIST and GTSRB can be detected with high probabil-
ity, too.
4.3 Query modification
In this subsection, we compare watermark invalidation by query
modification and model modification.
4.3.1 Evalaution of watermark accuracy after query modification
andmodel modification. We compare the watermark accuracy when
the unauthorized service provider returns
• fK (xkey) without model and query modification,
• fK (AE(xkey)) with query modificaion by autoencoder, and
• f˜K (xkey) with model modificaion by pruning.
Experimental setup. In query modification, given a query xkey,
the unauthorized user returns fK (AE(xkey)). For this evaluation,
we did not use the detection step because all given samples are key
samples to evaluate the true positive rate.
In model modification, we first prune q percentage of weights
having smaller absolute values in the model is made zero (pruning).
We changed q from 0 to 90 by 10. After pruning, the entire network
is retrained for ten epochs by Adam with learning rate 0.001. When
the pruning rate q becomes larger, model verification can become
more difficult while the test accuracy of the model is decreased
more. Since it is meaningless to attain watermark invalidation with
sacrificing test accuracy, we varied pruning rate r so that the dete-
rioration of the test accuracy is less than 10% of the baseline (e.g,
test accuracy of the model without watermark). For each setting,
we tuned the pruning rate so that the watermark accuracy becomes
the worst.
Results. The results are summarized in Table 2. The table com-
pares the watermark accuracy when nine types of key samples
are used watermark verification under query modification (autoen-
coder) and model modification (pruning) for four datasets. Every
type of key samples achieves watermark accuracy 1.0 for all datasets
when watermark invalidation by model or query modification is
not applied. This means that watermark works perfectly if the unau-
thorized service provider does not try to invalidate the watermark
of the model. The watermark accuracy under query modification
significantly decreases for CIFAR10B and CIFAR100 with most of
the key samples. Considering that the detection of key samples
works more successfully for CIFAR-type tasks, query modification
works as a strong attack against CIFAR-type tasks. On the other
hand, for MNIST and GTSRB, attack by model modification works
successfully. Interestingly, model modification and query modifica-
tion work complementary to each other. The results show that there
exist no key samples that can achieve high watermark accuracy un-
der both model modification and query modification for all datasets.
In Section 5, we introduce a novel watermarking method that can
achieve high watermark accuracy under both model modification
and query modification.
4.4 Invalidation by query modification
We confirmed that, for certain types of key samples, our detec-
tion method could identify them autoencoder can invalidate the
watermark. Putting everythin together, we summarize the entire
invalidation process using autoencoder, which is described by the
following procedure:
Query modification by autoencoder
(1) Require: Training sample set X , parameter r (percentile), k
(cross validation)
(2) Preparation:
(a) Train autoencoder AE with X
(b) Evaluate the r -percentile quantile point of loss(x) where
x ∈ X by k-fold cross validation and set the r -percentile
quantile point as τREC
(c) Evaluate the r -percentile quantile point of JSD(fK (x)| | fK (AE(x)))
where x ∈ X by k-fold cross validation and set the r -
percentile quantile point as τJSD
(3) Key sample detection: Given a query x , if JSD(y | |yˆ) > τJSD or
JSD(y | |yˆ) > τJSD, judge x as a key sample. Otherwise, judge
x as an ortinal sample.
(4) Query modification: If x is detected as a key sample, return
f (AE(x)) to the model owner. Otherwise, return f (x) to the
model owner.
In the preparation step, the unauthorized user trains an autoen-
coder and estimate the two thresholds using samples. Upon request
of prediction with a query, the unauthorized user judges if the query
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Table 1: Detection rate of key samples. The lows “rec loss” and “JSD” show the detection rate when reconstruction loss and
JSD are used for the detection rule, respectively. “both” shows the detection rate when both measures are used for detection.
MNIST
[21]-content
mesuears\key samples “test”, gray “test”, blue symbol “heart”, gray “heart”, red [21]-unrelated [21]-noise [12]-AFS [14]-DS
rec loss 1.0 - 1.0 1.0 - 0.28 0.49 0.0 1.0
JSD 0.0 - 1.0 1.0 - 0.0 0.067 0.23 1.0
both 1.0 - 1.0 1.0 - 0.28 0.49 0.23 1.0
GTSRB
[21]-content
mesuears\key samples “test”, gray “test”, blue symbol “heart”, gray “heart”, red [21]-unrelated [21]-noise [12]-AFS [14]-DS
rec loss 0.10 0.95 0.063 0.047 0.09 0.12 0.51 0.0 1.0
JSD 0.067 0.04 0.32 0.18 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.033 0.26
both .14 0.95 0.37 0.21 0.1 0.12 0.51 0.033 1.0
CIFAR10
[21]-content
mesuears\key samples “test”, gray “test”, blue symbol “heart”, gray “heart”, red [21]-unrelated [21]-noise [12]-AFS [14]-DS
rec loss 0.55 1.0 0.52 0.09 0.98 0.27 1.0 1.0 1.0
JSD 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.18 0.0 0.65 0.2 0.66
both 0.98 1.0 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.27 1.0 1.0 1.0
CIFAR100
[21]-content
mesuears\key samples “test”, gray “test”, blue symbol “heart”, gray “heart”, red [21]-unrelated [21]-noise [12]-AFS [14]-DS
rec loss 0.49 1.0 0.53 0.12 0.99 0.0 1.0 0.43 1.0
JSD 0.81 0.71 0.79 0.94 0.05 0.03 0.26 0.1 0.1
both 0.92 1.0 0.91 0.96 0.99 0.037 1.0 0.47 1.0
Table 2: Watermark accuracy before (no invalidation) and after applying queri modification (autoencoder) and model modifi-
cation (pruning).
[21]-content
dataset watermark invalidation \key samples “test”, gray “test”, blue symbol “heart”, gray “heart”, red [21]-unrelated [21]-noise [12]-AFS [14]-DS
no invalidation 1.0 - 1.0 1.0 - 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
MNIST query mod. (autoencoder) 0.99 - 0.0007 0.96 - 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.4
model mod. (pruning) 0.0034 - 0.023 0.0020 - 0.89 0.20 1.0 0.67
no invalidation 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
GTSRB query mod. (autoencoder) 0.39 0.20 0.019 0.081 0.28 0.78 0.051 0.90 0.10
model mod. (pruning) 0.025 0.0011 0.0012 0.0 0.0011 0.0 0.066 0.87 0.1
no invalidation 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
CIFAR10 query mod. (autoencoder) 0.069 0.021 0.017 0.021 0.39 1.0 0.014 0.73 0.23
model mod. (pruning) 0.57 0.73 0.30 0.99 0.14 0.010 0.070 0.86 0.30
no invalidation 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
CIFAR100 query mod. (autoencoder) 0.064 0.026 0.010 0.016 0.35 0.68 0.0082 0.56 0.0
model mod. (pruning) 0.88 0.99 0.082 0.95 0.96 0.11 0.16 0.57 0.17
works as a key sample at detection step. If so, the query is modified
by the autoencoder so that it does not work as a key sample and
returns f (AE(x)) as the prediction result. Otherwise, it returns f (x)
without any modification.
5 WARTERMARKINGWITH EXPONENTIAL
WEIGHTING
In this section, we propose a watermarking method that resists
invalidation with both model modification and query modification
more robustly. Our defense against watermark invalidation consists
of two strategies. One is a defense against query modification. The
other is a strategy for embedding the watermark into models that
are tolerant of watermark invalidation.
5.1 Generation of Key Samples by Label
Change
As we observed in the last section, key samples generated by exist-
ing methods can be invalidated by either of model modification or
query modification. As a defense against query modification, we
need a key sample that cannot be detected by unauthorized users
while it can be verified by the model owner.
Query modification detects a query that largely deviates from
the training sample distribution as a key sample and then modifies
the detected key sample so that it follows the training sample dis-
tribution by autoencoder. Our idea to avoid this invalidation is to
utilize a sample that perfectly follows the training sample distribu-
tion as a key sample. Since what the unauthorized user observes is
non-labeled queries only, such key samples following the training
sample distribution are undetectable. We embed such key samples
into the model as the watermark.
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In the generation process of a key sample, we randomly select
a training sample without any modification, and we then change
the label of the sample to a label that is different from original one
(label change). For example, we label an image of a dog as “cat”
and use this as a key sample. If we train a model with a training
dataset containing key samples generated in this way, the model
would recognize dog images except for this specific key sample
as “dog” while this key sample of the dog image is recognized as
“cat”. The model owner can verify watermark using this response
from the model. Recall that queries issued by model owners are
not labeled. Thus, key samples generated in such a way become
perfectly indistinguishable from training samples. Once such key
samples are embedded into a model, the model owner can verify
the watermark without being detected by the unauthorized service
provider.
Our key samples are somewhat similar to [21]-unrelated. [21]-
unrelated selects images from unrelated classification task. These
can be detected by the unauthorized service providers who train the
generative model of the training samples, as we did by autoencoder.
5.2 Embedding Key Samples with Exponential
Weighting
Key samples generated by label change are undetectable. However,
training with such key samples would cause overfit to the model.
Our preliminary experiments revealed that watermark embedded in
this way could be instantly invalidated by model modification, such
as pruning or re-training. This is because pruning or re-training
resolves to overfit of the model to key samples.
If a large number of model parameters having small absolute val-
ues are involved in prediction, prediction results of samples would
be significantly changed by pruning or re-training of the model. Our
idea to avoid this by imprinting key samples with greater force so
that they are not removed by model modification. More specifically,
during the training process, we identify model parameters of the
neural network model that significantly contribute to giving pre-
dictions and increase the weight value exponentially so that model
modification cannot change the prediction behavior of samples
(including key samples) before and after model modification.
In the lth layer of model f , we denote the input to the lth layer by
hl and the model parameters by θ l . opl (hl ,θ l ) denotes the operetor
to process computation with hl and θ l in the lth th layer (e.g. Affine
transformation, convolution). al denotes the activation function.
Then, the output of the lth layer is given by
hl+1 = al (opl (hl ,θ l )). (10)
where the output is transfered to the input of the l + 1th layer, hl+1.
Let us denote the ith element of θ l asθ li . We exponentially weight
each model parameter as follows.
EW (θ l ,T ) = θ lexp,θ lexp, i =
exp |θ li |T
maxi exp |θ li |T
θ li (11)
where T is a hyperparameter for adjusting the intensity of the
weighting. After weighting the parameters, the lth layer finally
outputs
hl+1 = al (opl (hl ,EW (θ l ,T ))). (12)
The procedure of watermarking by exponential weighting is as
follows.
Watermarking by exponetial weighting
(1) Require: Training sample set X , key sample set K generated
with label change
(2) Train the model f with X where we denote operation of
each layer by Equation (10)
(3) After training, replace Equation (10) of each layer of the
model f with Equation (12). Then, retrain f with X ∪K and
obtain fK
We explain forward and back-propagation of neural networks
represented by Equation (12) with respect toθ l . In forward-propagation,
opl is performed with model parameters exponentially weighted by
EW . With this, parameters that do not have large absolute values
are forced to have small values. Since parameters with small values
do not have a large influence on operation opl , only parameters that
have large absolute values influence operation opl eventually. In
back-propagation, gradients of hl+1 with respect to θ l is calculated
using the differential chain rule as follows.
∂hl+1
∂θ l
=
∂hl+1
∂opl
∂opl
∂EW (θ l )
∂EW (θ l )
∂θ l
(13)
Exponential weighting can be treated as one of activation functions
of neural netwokrs. Back-propagation with exponential weighting
is incorporated into back propagation in a natural manner as in Eq.
13.
6 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate the proposed watermarking method
regarding the predictive performance of the model after embedding
watermarks (test accuracy) and the verification performance (AUC)
under model modification and query modification. The results are
compared with the existing method [12, 14, 21]. Comparison with
[20] is not shown because this method assumes the existence of a
trusted third party and is not directly comparable.
6.1 Experimental setting
6.1.1 Dataset. We use the following four image datasets (MNIST,
GTSRB, CIFAR10, and CIFAR100) for the evaluation. Pixel values
of images in all datasets are in [0, 1].
MNIST[4] is a grayscale handwritten digits dataset that has a
training set of 60,000 samples, and a test set of 10,000 samples. The
size of each image is 28 × 28 pixels, and there are ten classes from
"0" to "9".
GTSRB[15] is a RGB traffic sign dataset that consists of 39,209
training samples and 12,630 test samples. Each image is labeled
with one of 43 classes. Since the size of images contained in this
dataset is not unique, we resize all images as 32 × 32 pixels.
CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 are RGB object classification datasets
with 50,000 training samples and 10,000 test samples. The size of
each image is 32 × 32 pixels and is labeled with one of 10 and 100
classes, respectively.
Existing studies suppose the unauthorized service provider can
use the training samples held by the model owner for watermark
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invalidation, which is not often possible in reality. In our experi-
mental setup, we suppose training samples and samples used for
watermark invalidation are mutually exclusive. For the detailed
setting about the assignment of samples for the model owner and
the unauthorized service provider, see Table 6 in Appendix B.
6.1.2 Model training and key sample generation and embedding. We
employed ResNet 32[9] for the target classification model. Also, we
employed a six-layer convolutional autoencoder for query modifi-
cation. The detailed architecture of the autoencoder is summarized
in Table 4 in Appendix A. Table 5 in Appendix A summarizes the
hyperparameters used to train ResNet and autoencoder.
Key sample generation by existing methods follows Section 3.1.
We did not create key samples [21]-content “test”, blue and [21]-
content “heart”, red in MNIST because images of MNIST dataset
are gray scale.
For [21]-content, unrelated and noise methods, we embedded
the watermark into the model by training the model with training
samples and key samples from scratch. For [12]-AFS and [14]-DS
methods, we trained the model with only training samples and re-
trained with training samples and key samples to embed watermark
the model.
For our watermarking method, we randomly selected 30 sam-
ples from the training dataset and generate key samples. For each
key sample, we assign a label that is different from the original
label randomly and embed them as watermark with exponential
weighting. Recall that watermarking of a neural network and its
verification is a game between the model owner and the unautho-
rized service provider. Parameters for invalidation methods (e.g.,
pruning rate, thresholds for key sample detection) are tuned so that
the watermark accuracy becomes the lowest while parameters for
embedding methods (e.g., the temperature parameter of exponen-
tial weighting) are tuned so that the watermark accuracy becomes
the highest. For exponential weighting, we adopted T = 2.0 for all
datasets by preliminary experiments. For evaluation of AUC, we
used a model trained with training samples only.
6.2 Predictive Performance Before and After
Embedding Watermark
We first evaluate the prediction performance of the model before
and after embedding a watermark by test accuracy. In Table 3,
the columns with “no inv.” show the test accuracy of models with
watermark when the unauthorized service provider performs no
watermark invalidation. As seen from the results of the columns
“no inv.” in Table 3, all embedding methods can well preserve the
predictive performance of the model even after embedding the
watermark.
The columns with “model mod.” and “query mod.” in Table 3
show the test accuracy of models with watermark under model
modification (pruning) and query modification (autoencoder), re-
spectively. The difference of the test accuracies before and after
watermark invalidation is at most 10% in all settings. Therefore,
these invalidations are reasonable (i.e., does not degrade the test
accuracy too much) from the viewpoint of the unauthorized service
provider in our experiment.
6.3 Verification Performance under
Invalidation
We evaluate the verification performance of the watermarking
methods by AUC under model modification and query modification.
Let f and fK be model without and with watermark, respectively.
AUC is evaluated as follows:
(1) Sample K ′ from K randomly with replacement.
(2) For each xkey ∈ K ′, evluate f (xkey) and fK (xkey) as queries
and evaluate the true positive rate and false positive rate
(3) We repeat Step 1 and Step 2 for 30 times, draw the ROC
curve, and evaluate the AUC.
As the baseline of the verification performance, we first evalu-
ated the AUCs of the model without any watermark invalidation.
We experimentally confirmed that the AUCs of the verification
performance with all the watermark methods except [12]-AFS was
1. This means that the watermark can be perfectly verified by the
model owner when the watermark is correctly embedded, and no
watermark invalidation is performed. The AUC of AFS was not
one but still high. This is because models without watermark can
predict correct labels for key samples (adversarial examples in AFS)
sometimes and this makes the false positive rate non zero.
Next, we evaluated the verification performance of the model
with watermark under watermark invalidation.
Figure 2 shows the AUCs of verification under invalidation by
model modification and query modification where the number of
key samples |K ′ | is varied as 20, 10, and 5.
Figure 2(a) shows the AUC of each watermark method under
model modification (pruning, top) and query modification (bottom)
when |K ′ | = 20. In [21]-content type method, the tolerance of prun-
ing depends on the datasets; AUC is high in CIFAR10 and CIFAR100
while AUC is low in GTSRB and MNIST. The tolerance to query
modification depends on the special image to be superimposed and
the datasets. [21]-content “test” gray, and [21]-content“heart” red
achieve high AUC in all datasets even under query modification
while the other types of key samples have low AUC in CIFAR10 and
CIFAR100. [21]-unrelated has high AUC in all datasets under query
modification, but AUC is very low in CIFAR10 and GTSRB under
invalidation by pruning. [21]-noise has low AUC under pruning in
GTSRB and query modification in CIFAR10 and CIFAR100. [12]-AFS
has very low AUC under pruning in CIFAR100. [14]-DS has very
low AUC under query modification in CIFAR 100. The proposed
method achieves AUC 1 under any invalidation for all datasets.
Thus, no existing methods achieve AUC 1 in all cases while the
proposed method achieves AUC 1 in all cases. From these results,
the proposed method achieves the best watermark accuracy when
|K ′ | = 20.
Next, we see the results at |K ′ | = 10 and |K ′ | = 5 (Figure 2(b) and
Figure 2(c)). The verification performance at |K ′ | = 10, 5 is expected
to be less than |K ′ | = 20 because verification performance decreases
when |K ′ | is small. In fact, for example, in the results of [14]-DS,
it achieves AUC = 1 in seven of eight cases when |K ′ | = 20 but
AUC decreases as |K ′ | decreases. The proposed method achieves
AUC 1 in almost all cases even when |K ′ | = 10. When |K ′ | = 5, the
worst AUC among all the settings is about 0.85 (under pruning in
GTSRB), but it still achieves a higher AUC than AUCs of all existing
methods.
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Table 3: The test accuracy ofmodels without watermark andmodels watermarked by existing and the proposedmethod under
watermark invalidation in four datasets. “No inv” denotes that no watermark invalidation is performed. “model mod.” and
“query mod.” denotes model modification by pruning and query modification is performed for watermark invalidation. The
number in the parenthesis in the “model mod.” column represents the pruning rate r that gives the worst watermark accuracy.
MNIST GTSRB CIFAR10 CIFAR100
invalidation invalidation invalidation invalidation
methods no inv. model mod. query mod. no inv. model mod. query mod. no inv. model mod. query mod. no inv. model mod. query mod.
no watermark 99.6% - - 97.3% - - 91.3% - - 66.9% - -
[21]-content 99.6% 99.4% (20%) 94.0% 97.0% 97.4% (10%) 93.0% 91.5% 89.9% (10%) 89.1% 67.6% 62.7% (0%) 63.8%
[21]-content - - - 97.0% 97.2% (0%) 92.1% 91.0% 89.0% (40%) 88.7% 67.2% 62.3% (10%) 62.9%
[21]-content 99.7% 99.3% (30%) 99.4% 97.2% 97.6% (10%) 93.7% 91.1% 90.6% (0%) 88.8% 67.8% 62.1% (10%) 63.4%
[21]-content 99.7% 99.3% (0%) 99.5% 97.2% 97.5% (10%) 93.7% 91.4% 90.1% (10%) 88.6% 66.7% 61.9% (10%) 62.3%
[21]-content - - - 97.3% 97.8% (10%) 93.7% 91.0% 88.1% (20%) 89.0% 67.9% 62.5% (0%) 62.8%
[21]-unrelated 99.6% 99.1% (20%) 93.8% 97.0% 92.7% (90%) 94.1% 90.7% 89.4% (0%) 88.7% 67.8% 57.1% (70%) 65.1%
[21]-noise 99.6% 99.2% (20%) 97.9% 97.0% 97.2% (0%) 93.3% 91.5% 82.1% (80%) 89.3% 66.7% 55.3% (70%) 64.2%
[12]-AFS 99.6% 99.2% (10%) 99.4% 97.7% 94.8% (90%) 94.7% 92.0% 87.1% (80%) 89.7% 68.1% 57.4% (70%) 65.9%
[14]-DS 99.6% 99.1% (90%) 99.4% 97.3% 95.4% (90%) 94.7% 91.2% 86.6% (80%) 89.3% 68.3% 56.7% (70%) 63.3%
proposal 99.2% 99.0% (0%) 91.9% 96.8% 95.0% (90%) 93.2% 92.0% 82.5% (90%) 90.3% 67.4% 56.5% (80%) 62.8%
As seen from the results, we can conclude that the proposed
method, key samples with label change and embedding with expo-
nential weighting, shows the best tolerance of both model modifi-
cation and query modification without significant decrease of test
accuracy.
7 CONCLUSION
In this study, we proposed a novel watermarking method for the
neural network that is tolerant of both model modification and
query modification. Our watermarking method consists of two
components, (1) key generation by label change, and (2) key em-
bedding by exponential weighting.
We experimentally demonstrated that our watermarking method
achieves high verification performance even under a malicious at-
tempt of unauthorized service providers to invalidate the verifica-
tion process such as model modification and query modification.
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(a) AUC under mdel modification (pruning, top) and query modification (autoencoder, bottom) in |K ′ | = 20
(b) AUC under mdel modification (pruning, top) and query modification (autoencoder, bottom) in |K ′ | = 10
(c) AUC under mdel modification (pruning, top) and query modification (autoencoder, bottom) in |K ′ | = 5
Figure 2: Verification performance (AUC) of existing and proposed watermark methods under invalidation by model modifi-
cation (pruning, top of each subfigure) and querymodification (bottom of each subfigure) for CIFAR10, CIFAR100, GTSRB and
MNIST when |K ′ | = 20, 10, 5. The vertical axis shows AUC and the horizontal axis shows the watermarking methods in each
dataset. Black dash line shows “AUC 0.5” (verification is perfomed randomly) and green dash line shows “AUC 1” (verification
performed perfectly).
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A ARCHITECTURE OF THE AUTOENCODER
AND MODEL HYPERPARAMETERS
Table 4 shows the architecture of our convolutional autoencoder
and Table 5 summarizes the hyperparameters used to train ResNet
and autoencoder.
Table 4: Architecture of autoencoder. The layertype of
“conv”, “deconv” and “bn” means convolution, deconvolu-
tion and batch normalization respectively. Relu and sigmoid
means activation function.
layer type kernel size stride
conv,bn(relu) 3 × 3 × 16 2
conv,bn(relu) 3 × 3 × 32 2
conv,bn(relu) 3 × 3 × 64 2
deconv,bn(relu) 3 × 3 × 32 2
deconv,bn(relu) 3 × 3 × 16 2
deconv,bn(sigmoid) 3 × 3 × 3 2
Table 5: Model parameters.
parameter resnet autoencoder
optimization Momentum SGD Adam
epoch 100 400
mini batch size 100 100
key mini batch size 4 -
learning rate 0.1(×0.1 when epoch is 40, 60) 0.001
B ASSIGNMENTS OF SAMPLES
Table 6 shows (1) the number of samples that the model owner used
to train classification model, (2) the number of key samples that
the model owner embedded into the model and (3) sample size that
the unauthorized service provider utilized to invalidate watermark,
in each dataset. The total numbers of training samples of each
dataset are 60,000 (MNIST), 39,209 (GTSRB) and 50,000 (CIFAR10,
CIFAR100). We suppose the unauthorized service provider can
use 1% (MNIST), 5% (GTSRB) and 10% (CIFAR10, CIFAR100) of
total training samples for invalidation. Since MNIST and GTSRB
are relatively easy classification task, if the unauthorized service
provider has a sufficiently large number of samples (as ten % in
CIFAR10 and CIFAR100), the unauthorized service provider can
train a model that can achieve a sufficiently high test accuracy. In
such a situation, the unauthorized service provider does not have
the motivation to use licensed models without permission. For this
reason, we assume the unauthorized user has a smaller number of
samples for invalidation for MNIST and GTSRB than CIFAR10 and
CIFAR100.
The number of key samples embedded into the model is different
for each method for the following reasons. Embedding by [21]-
content requires that the model well generalizes the symbols or
logotypes to achieve good AUC. It is thus desirable to embed a
large number of key samples. Watermarking using [12]-AFS and
[14]-DS take advantage of model overfitting to specific key samples.
So, we embedded 30 key samples into the model following the
recommendation of by [12] and [14].
Table 6: The number of samples used for training, and wa-
termark, andmodel invalidation. Each column shows (1) the
number of samples that the model owner used to train the
classification model (training samples), (2) the number of
samples that the model owner embedded into the model
(key samples), and (3) the number of samples that the unau-
thorized service provider utilized to detect key samples in
each dataset.
dataset MNIST GTSRB CIFAR10 CIFAR100
#training samples 59,400 37,248 45,000 45,000
[21]-content 53,548 37,046 40,478 44,558
[21]-unrelated 2,400 6,742 6,742 6,742
#key samples for: [21]-noise 53,548 37,046 40,478 44,558
[12]-AFS 30 30 30 30
[14]-DS 30 30 30 30
#samples used for key sample detection 600 1,961 5,000 5,000
